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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was it proper to grant a Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings when the procedure followed on this Motion 
transformed the Motion into one for Summary Judgment, and the 
Court refused to allow Defendant to file relevant affidavits? 
2. Utah Code Annotated Section 57-14-6(a) states that 
a property owner can be liable for injury caused by "willful or 
malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous 
condition". Was it error for the trial court to dismiss 
Plaintiff's complaint when the complaint contained allegations of 
such " . . . willful or malicious failure to guard or warn . . ."? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c): 
Motion for Judgment on the pleadings. After 
the pleadings are closed but within such time 
as to not delay the trial, any party may move 
for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and 
not excluded by the Court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity 
to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b): 
Summary Judgment for defending party. A 
party against whom a claim, counter-claim or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or 
any part thereof. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c): 
Motion and proceedings thereon. . . The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . 
Utah Code Annotated Section 57-14-3: 
Except as specifically provided in 
subsections (1) (2) of Section 57-14-6, an 
Owner of Land owes no duty of care to the 
premises for safe entry or use by any person 
using the premises for any recreational 
purpose, or to give any warning of a 
dangerous condition, use, structure, or 
activity on those premises to those persons. 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 57-14-6(a): 
Nothing in this act limits in any way any 
liability which otherwise exists for willful 
or malicious failure to guard or warn against 
a dangerous condition, use, structure, or 
activity or for deliberate, willful, or 
malicious injury to persons or property . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the trial Court's order granting 
Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of Defendant and dismissing 
Plaintiff's complaint. Though the Order of the Court was called 
"Judgment on the Pleadings" it is apparent from the procedure 
that this characterization was erroneous, and that the Order 
granted was actually in the nature of a Summary Judgment. 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff's wrongful death action was filed on or about 
June 19, 1987. The basis for Plaintiff's claim was that Randal 
Golding had drowned in Defendant's irrigation canal, and that 
Defendant had acted wrongfully in not warning or guarding against 
the condition in the canal which led to Randal Golding's death. 
Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum for Judgment on the 
Pleadings claiming that Utah Code Annotated Section 57-14-1, et 
seq. barred any recovery by Plaintiff in the absence of willful 
or malicious conduct on Defendant's part. Subsequent memoranda 
on this issue were filed by counsel for both Plaintiff and 
Defendant. On December 17, 1987, the Trial Court's Minute Entry 
granting Defendant' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was 
signed. 
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Facts 
On June 25, 1986, Randal Golding, a seventeen year old 
boy, and some teenage friends decided to go swimming in the 
irrigation canal owned by Defendant. While swimming in this 
irrigation canal, one of Mr. Golding's friends went over a spill-
way and became entrapped in the backwash created at the bottom 
of the spill-way. Randal Golding, seeing the desperate plight of 
his friend, jumped into the water in an effort to save his 
friend. Mr. Golding was successful in this attempt, and his 
friend was able to swim out of the backwash to safety. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Golding then became trapped in the backwash 
himself and subsequently drowned. 
Defendant maintained no barricades, fences or other 
guards which would protect individuals such as Randal Golding 
from entering the irrigation canal or from going over the spill-
way or entering into the area of the backwash created by the 
spill-way. Likewise, Defendant maintained no signs warning 
individuals such as Randal Golding of the dangers of entering 
into the irrigation canal, going over the spill-way, or entering 
the backwash created by the spill-way. 
The Complaint was filed by the personal representative 
of Randal Golding's estate, alleging that Defendant's wrongful 
actions in maintaining the canal had led to the death of Randal 
Golding. Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
and Memorandum in Support Thereof alleging that, under the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Sectipn 57-14-1, et seq., no 
4 
cause of action could be maintained against Defendant in the 
absence of willful or malicious conduct on Defendant's part. 
Plaintiff filed a responsive memorandum arguing that there was 
willful and malicious conduct on the part of the Defendant in 
failing to guard or warn against the dangers in Defendant's canal 
and spill-way. Plaintiff specifically requested further time to 
conduct discovery on this issue and to file affidavits in 
accordance with Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings pages 8-9.) 
The Court did not exclude Plaintiff's arguments 
alleging willful and malicious conduct on Defendant's part, but 
nevertheless entered an order granting Defendant's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. 
Summary of Arguments 
1. The Motion for Judgment on the pleadings was 
transformed into a Motion for Summary Judgment by arguments of 
counsel relating to matters outside the pleadings, which 
arguments were not excluded by the Court. U.R.C.P. 12(c). 
2. The Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint in 
this summary nature was inappropriate under either the standards 
governing judgment on the pleadings, or standards governing 
summary judgment. U.R.C.P. 12(c); 56(c). 
3. Plaintiff alleged items, in both the Complaint and 
in the memorandum opposing the Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings which, if proven, would establish that Defendant was 
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Rule 12(c) is very clear that when additional evidence 
outside the pleadings is introduced and not excluded, the Court 
shall treat a Rule 12(c) motion as a motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, the Court shall allow all parties reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56. 
Despite the claims of Plaintiff's attorney that 
affidavits could be supplied evidencing willful and malicious 
conduct, and the pleas of Plaintiff's attorney that additional 
time be granted to collect necessary information to supply such 
affidavits, the Court ignored the clear mandate of Rule 12(c) and 
Rule 56 in granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings. Such action was clearly erroneous and the case should 
be remanded to the Trial Court to allow Plaintiff to introduce 
the evidence which is available to support the assertions that 
there was willful and malicious conduct on the part of the 
Defendant. 
POINT II 
THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WAS ERRONEOUS UNDER RULE 
12(C) 
The Trial Court ruled that there was no allegation of 
willful or malicious conduct contained in Plaintiff's complaint. 
This ruling was erroneous. 
Paragraph 11 of the Complaint stated, "Defendant 
breached the duty of care owed to Plaintiff . . . in at least the 
follow (sic) particulars: 
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discussed the term "willful" in the workman's compensation 
statute and implied that failure to take action in the face of 
notice that an actual or potential hazard existed, is a "willful" 
failure to act. The Court in that case also equated "willful" 
with the omission to act in reckless disregard for the safety of 
others. Finally, in Sorenson v. U.S., 521 F.2d 325, 329 (9th 
Cir. 1975) the Court held that one who deliberately closes his or 
her eyes to information which would disclose a duty to act, is 
guilty of "willful" misconduct as that term is used in Section 
6672 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The Complaint alleges that Defendant knew or at least 
had access to information that there was an unsafe condition in 
its canal and that, at the very least, warning signs should be 
posted. In spite of this knowledge, the Defendant did nothing. 
Thus, the Complaint alleges facts which, if proven, would 
establish "willful and malicious" conduct on the part of 
Defendant. It was therefore error to grant a Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings. 
Admittedly, the only cause of action contained in the 
Complaint was one entitled "Negligence". However, when the body 
of a document is in conflict with the titles or headings of the 
document, the wording in the body takes precedence. Lund v. 
Third Dist. Ct. , 62 P.2d 278, 280 (Utah 1936); Kimberlv v. 
DeWitt, 606 P.2d 612, 614 (Okla. 1980) 
9 
POINT III 
THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT 
UNDER THE STANDARDS OF RULE 56 WAS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Plaintifffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings very specifically alleged 
that information co u 1 d b e o b t. a 1 r I e nil r e g a r d i rig I) e f' e n d ant's 
knowledge of unsafe conditions in the canal. Plaintiff's 
memorandum ifuiflhf't requested time to develop this information 
through discovery and affidavits. 
The fact that extraneous arguments were considered and 
not excluded b} the Court trai isformed Defendant's Moti on from one 
for Judgment on the Pleadings into one for" Summary J udgment. 
[U.R.C - 12(c)] The standard for granting a Motion for Summary 
Judgment • i s w e] 1 known, :! s tl lat theii e mi ist be n :: material 
issue r - * [U.R.C.P. 56(c); Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 
615 (Utah 1982)] 
Plaintiff's Memorandum niiil Complaint both alleged that 
Defendant knew of the unsafe nature of its canal and spill-way 
and yet took no action to warn or protect the public. Such 
inaction in the face of knowledge is justifiably characterized as 
willful and malicious. Plaintiff should have been given the 
opporti mi t>> t; ,c present affidavits and other evidence in support 
of its claims in this regard. ndeed, Rule 1 2(c) ver y cl early 
states that when a Motion is transformed into one for Summary 
Judg ment "a 1 ] parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material pertinent to such a Motion by Rule 56." Had 
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the trial court acted properly and allowed Plaintiff to submit 
his affidavits, there would have been factual issues raised 
barring Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's Complaint and Memorandum contained 
allegations which, if proven, would establish the existence of 
willful and malicious conduct on the part of Defendant. Utah 
Code Annotated Section 57-14-6(1) specifically states that a 
landowner may be liable for willful and malicious failure to 
guard or warn against a dangerous condition which results in the 
death or injury of another party. It was therefore error for the 
Trial Court to grant judgment in Defendant's favor under either 
Rule 12(c) or Rule 56. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 1988. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P.C. 
Richard I. Ashton 
David A. Wilde 
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